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Abstract 
 
The exemption for Value Added Taxation (VAT) can be used to pursue distributive 
objectives. Goods like food, housing, medicine, or infrastructure services (water, 
telecommunication, postal) are very often partially or totally exempted from VAT. The 
exemption of infrastructure services had been frequently combined with market entry 
restrictions. Both instruments should assure the fulfilling of the universal service obligation 
(USO). VAT-exemption leads to two problems, at least: (i) the expectable financial gain, 
which can be achieved by the exempted firm, is unpredictable, and (ii) the welfare 
consequences depend on the prevailing type of market structure (competition, monopoly with 
or without price discrimination, or dominant firm). The VAT-exemption for German postal 
services can be seen as an outstanding case study to show the typical consequences. Because 
of empirical references for intensive use of price discrimination by Deutsche Post AG and 
strong arguments of Deutsche Post AG as a dominant firm welfare could be increased by 





Vielfach werden sektorale Mehrwertsteuerbefreiungen mit der Verfolgung 
verteilungspolitischer Ziele begründet. Gerade für Güter wie Nahrungsmittel, Wohnen, 
Gesundheits- oder Infrastrukturdienstleistungen (Wasserversorgung, Telekommunikation, 
Postdienste) gilt/galt ein reduzierter Mehrwertsteuersatz oder die Mehrwertbesteuerung 
entfiel/fällt vollständig. Die steuerliche Begünstigung von Infrastrukturgütern wird/wurde 
häufig mit Marktzutrittsbeschränkungen kombiniert. Beide Instrumente zusammen sollen 
verteilungspolitische Ziele im Raum, sogenannte Universaldienstverpflichtungen, erfüllen. 
Mehrwertsteuerbefreiungen führen einerseits dazu, dass der finanzielle Vorteil des Befreiten 
kaum vorhersehbar ist, und andererseits die Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Befreiung von den 
geltenden Marktstrukturen (Wettbewerb, Monopol, Markt mit dominanter Firma) abhängen. 
Die in Deutschland reformierte, aber immer noch bestehende Befreiung der Deutschen Post 
AG ist ein hervorragendes Beispiel, um die typischen Konsequenzen einer solchen Form der 
Verteilungspolitik zu beschreiben. Da die Deutsche Post AG erhebliche Möglichkeiten zur 
monopolistischen Preisdifferenzierung besitzt und einiges dafür spricht, dass sie sich als 
dominante Firma verhalten kann, würde die Wohlfahrt bei Wegfall der 
Mehrwertsteuerbefreiung ansteigen, ohne die Finanzierungsgrundlage für die 
Universaldienstverpflichtung zu beeinträchtigen. 
 
JEL-classification: L51, L87, K23      3
1 The Problem 
 
Universal service obligation (USO) usually means that all customers – low and high cost - 
will be served in a special market without discrimination which should be implemented by 
some/one firm(s) in the market. USOs are quite common in markets which were formerly 
dominated by public utilities (energy, postal services, public transportation, 
telecommunication, etc.). Market opening would cause unfair competition, if USO is not 
eliminated: The former monopolist has to bear additional costs which must not be burdened 
by the competitors. “Pay or play regulation” can be an alternative to fulfil USO without 
distorting competition: Suppliers which are providing services for high cost customers (play) 
are rewarded by reduced financial duties (pay). Reduced financial burden can be reached by 
an exemption for value added taxation (VAT). Not to be revenue-taxed allows to reduce 
prices or to finance additional costs. The objective of this paper is whether such kind of pay or 
play regulation could be a better alternative than franchise bidding. Franchise bidding means 
that state issues an invitation to tender about fulfilling USO and accept the tender with the 
lowest financial subsidy. This general question will be discussed for postal services in 
Germany, which are VAT-exempted if the USO is fulfilled. 
 
Germany is one of the few countries in the European Union which has legally opened his 
market for postal services until now (see Monopoly Commission 2009, marginal notes 4-5). 
Since the beginning of 2008 private competitors are allowed to serve postal services without 
any restrictions. Before the year 2008 the incumbent, German Mail Public Limited Company 
(DPAG), was legally protected against competition in the case of offering letters below 50 g 
(“Exklusivlizenz”, exclusive licence). This legally protected monopoly status was disclaimed 
politically as a necessary financial compensation given to DPAG to fulfil the German USO. 
Additionally, the DPAG was exempted from Value-Added-Taxation (VAT) to finance the 
German USO. After different federal governments and political parties had made several 
proposals for a reform of VAT (Bundesregierung 2008, and F.D.P. 2009), the exemption from 
Value-Added-Taxation (VAT) was legally extended to all firms which partially or completely 
provide German USO at the end of June 2010. Thus, DPAG or competitors are currently not 
obligated to charge VAT, if they provide several universal service items (letters, parcel up 
two kg, or else) to all German households in a non-discriminating way. 
   4
No VAT-exemption for USO-firms could have several implications which should be 
evaluated. First, the typical VAT-system allows to deduct VAT paid for non-labor inputs. 
This deduction can be seen as additional revenues, which lessens the burden of VAT for 
firms. The more a firm uses higher shares of labor inputs, the more important the VAT-
burden is. Second, the consequences of VAT depend on the type of customers: If customers 
are obliged to charge VAT, they are able to deduct VAT paid to USO-firms. These customers 
are only interested in net prices. VAT-exempted USOs incur a competitive disadvantage. 
Third, VAT-indebted USO firms could react by diminishing its net prices, especially for 
VAT-excepted customers. This strategy depends on the possibilities for firms to discriminate 
between excepted and indebted customers. Fourth, the competitive situation in the customer 
markets influences the consequences of the taxing system: For example, if the competitors of 
the dominant USO-firm behave as fringe firms, they decide about the price level. VAT-
indebted fringe firms face higher costs. Thus, the price for all firms increases. All four aspects 
should be recognized simultaneously. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will explain the German USO, including the 
VAT-exemption until June 2010 and the new legal situation, which is valid since July 1
st 
2010. Based on the model of Choné et al. (2000), the principles of VAT will be shown in 
section 3. Using standard microeconomic tools and assuming different market structures we 
are going to explain the consequences of VAT and VAT-exemption (chapter 4). Section 5 
empirically describes the market structure of German postal services. Depending on the 
prevailing market structure we are able to derive expected consequences of no VAT-
exemption. Chapter 6 contains some conclusions. 
 
 
2 USO for postal services in Germany 
 
Paragraph 11 of German Postal Law (PostG) codifies that postal services, which are 
indispensable, should be supplied nationwide with a specific quality and affordable tariffs. 
The German legal ordinance for postal services and USO (PULDV) explicates, that letters up 
to two kg, parcel up to 20 kg, newspaper/journals, registered mails, cash on deliver items, and 
express items are included by the USO. The incumbent DPAG has to provide a nationwide 
network of branch offices. Letters should reach recipients one day after delivery in eighty 
percent of cases, and two days after delivery in 95 percent of cases. The DPAG has put out   5
several negotiated agreements additionally, for example concerning the network of 
letterboxes. 
 
If the USO is not assured within a competitive environment, especially the incumbent DPAG 
declares that he is not able to fulfil this obligation, PostG shows two alternatives approaches 
(§§ 11-17): 
  Supplier which has significant market power could be committed to provide the universal 
service by the regulation authorities. Given that case the supplier is entitled to receive 
back the long run incremental costs of efficient provision. 
  The regulation authority puts out the universal service to the suppliers which charge the 
lowest costs. 
The expenses for universal services will be proportionally refinanced to turnovers (universal 
tax) if the supplier reaches more than € 500 000 revenues per year. Both approaches are in 
force since the beginning of 2008. 
 
Until now the DPAG has not used the possibility declaring to give up USO. The DPAG 
argues to be exempted from VAT in “exchange” for USO. According to § 4, 11 b UStG 
(Value Added Tax Law) turnovers created by DPAG and directly connected to the postal 
services were not taxed by VAT until June 2010. National stamps were also free from VAT (§ 
4, Nr. 8i UStG). Hence, the DPAG did not charge VAT for all turnovers which were 
associated with USO. But two exceptions were given: 
  Parcels which were posted by business units and were not delivered to public desks were 
taxed by DPAG. 
  Directed catalogues did not belong to USO, but DPAG did not levy VAT if catalogues 
have a weight less than 1 kg. 
For all turnovers which are not taxed by DPAG the incumbent DPAG is not able to realize 
deduction of input taxes. Thus, the value added taxes of non-labour inputs, which are used to 
fulfil USO, must be born by the incumbent. The DPAG suffers a cost disadvantage. Because 
the competitors were not exempted, they had to charge value added tax. If the customers of 
the competitors were able to deduct input taxes the disadvantage “VAT” turns back for the 
competitors: They can compete with a lower net price for postal services which are part of 
USO. In case of the impossibility to deduct input taxes the incumbent DPAG has an 
advantage with lower tariffs for universal postal services. This advantage must be relevant 
for private households, administrations, churches, and VAT-exempted sectors (bank,   6
insurance, charities, hospitals, medicals, and educational institutions). But if we look on local 
postal service markets, the services of competitors are very often used by VAT-exempted 
firms. This paradox can be probably explained by other cost factors (labour) which beat 
down their tariffs.  
 
Since July 1
st 2010 § 4, 11 b UStG (Value Added Tax Law), which exempts postal services 
from VA-Taxation, has been valid for firms providing universal services all over the country. 
Following a decision of the European Supreme Court, VA-Taxation will also be cancelled, if 
parts of universal services are supplied. Thus, in case of a nationwide provision competitors 
are exempted, if they convey letters up to two kg, parcel up to 10 kg, addressed books, 
catalogs, newspapers/journals until two kg, registered mails, and consignment of valuables. 
Parcels between ten and 20 kg, addressed books, catalogs, newspapers/journals more than 
two kg, express items and cash on deliver items are taxed by the complete VAT-rate. These 
items still are part of USO but are no longer VAT-exempted. Independent of conveyed items 
VAT-exemption is no longer given, if the postal service provider concludes individual 




3 Universal Service Obligation and the Objective of VAT-exemption 
 
In the past, public utilities very often had the obligation to supply their services to all 
customers at affordable tariffs (universal service obligation; USO). Charging common prices 
although the costs were different between the consumers (cross subsidization) allows to 
finance USO. In case of abolishing market entry barriers competitors would supply low cost 
consumers with low prices (cream skimming). Public utilities would suffer losses and have to 
leave the market. Choné et al. (2000) assume a market with one network good. A competitor 
is able to enter this market. Both firms can serve two customers which are located in different 
regions. Customers, who consume Z
HC live far away, therefore they cause high network 
connection costs. Low connection costs are associated with Z
LC, customers with Z
LC are 
located close to the network. 
 
Figure 1 shows both markets in the case of perfect competition (see also appendix 1). Thus, 
the marginal costs of the firms are represented by the (upward running) supply curves, S




HC illustrate typical demand curves, assumed to be identical for simplicity. 
Under such conditions the equilibrium points A and B are relevant with the corresponding 
prices (P* and P
HC) and quantities (ZA*, ZB
HC). Choné et al. (2000) distinguish between two 
conditions for USO: Ubiquity “U” (all customers must be served) and ubiquity combined with 
non-discrimination “UND” (all customers must be served by tariffs). Condition “UND” can 
be explained by figure 1: All high cost customers must be served at the price of P
*. But P
* is 
too low to cover cost of ZB
HC. Hence, the USO can be assured by 
  forbidding any competitors to supply Z
LC (restricted entry regulation), 
  opening both markets and organizing franchise bidding for ZB
HC. To secure supply of ZB
HC 
an auction must be organized which asks for the (lowest) subsidy P*HEA, 
  establishing pay or play regulation. The market for Z
LC is not subjected concerning the 
supply. If a competitor serves the market Z
HC by charging price P* it will be relieved to 
pay, for example to pay value added taxes.  
 
Figure 1: USO and Perfect Competition 
 
 
4 Microeconomics of Value Added Taxation 
 
4.1 Perfect Competition 
 
Figure 2 shows a general framework to explain VAT. The first stage represents the upstream 
market which delivers intermediate goods for the downstream market 1. The downstream 
market produces for private consumers or for another downstream market 2. We assume that   8
the typical European VAT subtraction method is used by fiscal authorities (for example 
Metclaf 1995): Firms are only taxed by their value added measured by the difference of the 
value of sold and purchased goods. In economic terms, the subtraction method leads to a 
taxation of the market based revenues minus the expenses for all non-labor inputs. 
Downstream firms are allowed to deduct capital expenditures. Downstream firms are 
sometimes exempted from VAT, but private customers are always non-rated.  
 
Figure 2 General Framework for VAT 
 
In the first step, Figure 3 shows the situation in which upstream (U) and downstream (D) 
firms are rated with the ad valorem tax rate t (see also appendix 2). Assuming the existence of 
a tax rate t, demand curve is given with D
U(1-t
U) in figure 3. Because of assuming perfect 
competition the supply curves S
U represents the aggregate marginal costs. Points A and B 
indicate the upstream market equilibrium with gross price P
U
G and net price P
U
N. Paid value 
added taxes are Z
U
B·t
U. Downstream firms use intermediate goods Z
U for producing final 
goods Z
D. The rated downstream firms are able to deduct paid value added taxes. Thus, they 
can calculate with the net price P
U
N which internally represents constant marginal costs MC
U. 
This marginal cost must be added to the supply curve S
D. Because of ad valorem taxation in 
the downstream market the new equilibrium point is G with gross price P
D
G and net price P
D
N. 
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    Figure 3: Upstream and downstream VAT – Perfect Competition 
 
In the second step, if downstream firms are not rated they have to calculate with the gross 
price P
U
G, which equals MC
U plus t
U (see figure 4 and also appendix 3). The market 
equilibrium is given by G, which leads to the uniform price C and the quantity Z
D
G. 
Comparing both situations it becomes obvious that non-rating firms decrease prices and 
increase quantities in the area of downstream. Profits, which can be simplified measured by 
producer surplus, increase from triangle P
D
NLJ to triangle CGM. The state incurs a loss of 
paid VAT at downstream stage t
D·Z
D
H and gains paid taxes at upstream by the rectangle 
RSTU. Thus, a very low increase of downstream profits causes hugh tax revenue reduction. 
The consumer gains consumer surplus by the area P
D
GHGC. Assuming that instead of VAT 
exemption a franchise bidding auction leads to the same profit increase for USO fulfilling 
downstream firm, the rectangle P
D
GHKN (+6.34 by any quantity of Z
D
H) can be calculated as 
additional welfare (more tax revenues, omitted consumer surplus), ignoring the tax burden 
caused by levying taxes to finance subsidy. Summing up, it can be said that pay or play 
regulation by VAT-exemption seems to be a very inefficient solution. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to anticipate the additional profits for regulators.   10
 




It is possible that a monopoly is given in the downstream market. Assuming that ad valorem 
taxation is implemented, the demand curve must be written as D
D(1-t
D) (see figure 5). To 
behave as a monopolistic downstream firm leads to the corresponding marginal revenue curve 
MR
D(1-t
D) (see also appendix 4).  
 
A rated downstream firm is able to deduct paid value added taxes from the upstream value 
added step. Thus, downstream firms are only burdened with upstream and downstream 
marginal costs (MC
U+MC
D). Equalizing marginal revenues with these marginal costs 
determines equilibrium point H, which is connected to gross price P
D




















A non rated downstream firm cannot deduct paid value added taxes. Consequently, the 
relevant marginal costs are MC
U+MC
D+t
U. In case of VAT-exemption the “original” demand 
curve D
D is given, followed by marginal revenue curve MR
D. The objective of profit 
maximisation leads to intersection point B, which is connected to price P
G and quantity Z
D
B. 
Value added tax revenues can only be expected on upstream stage by ISJQ. Profits are equal 
to triangle P
GGE. Thus, consumer surplus will be measured by FGP
G. 
 
The welfare consequences which have to be expected in case of changing from the case “with 
exemption” to the case “without exemption” are higher tax revenues, lower profits, and   11
decreasing consumer surplus. Assuming a situation like in figure 5 the aggregated welfare 
consequences are negative, but low. Dividing this negative value by Z
D
H leads to VWKP
D
G (-
0.2 per rata Z
D
H). In other words, in case of the existence of monopoly the abolishing of VAT-
exemption causes a welfare loss. This could be interpreted as a typical second best result: 
Two aberrations from perfect competition (“VAT-exemption and monopoly”) are better than 
one (“monopoly”). In reality, most infrastructure monopolists are not allowed to charge 
monopoly prices. Price cap regulations are rather very often implemented. Probably, as more 
as this regulation creates results as under perfect competition, the second best result as 
mentioned above disappears. 
 
Figure 5: VAT and Monopoly 
 
4.3 Price Discrimination 
 
The consequences of VAT also depend on the question to what extent suppliers have 
monopoly power and are able to discriminate consumers. Looking on figure 6 we can see that 
two groups buy products Z1
D and Z2







Figure 6 shows the situation, where VAT-exemption is given on the downstream market (see 
also appendix 5). Aggregating the two demand curves horizontally leads to the dashed line D
D 
as demand curve. Thus, the dashed line MR
D represents the aggregated marginal revenue 
curve. Because of VAT-exemption downstream suppliers have to bear the value added taxes   12
of the upstream market (tU). Additionally, they are confronted with their own marginal costs 
(MC
D) and the net price of upstream (MC
U). Equalizing the marginal revenue curve with all 
this costs leads to point H and the shadow price K. Profit maximizing in downstream market 1 
means to put the shadow price K on a level with marginal revenue (MR
D
1). Thus, point H1 is 
optimal which leads to the associated price P
E and quantity ZD
E. Maximizing profit for market 
2in the same way, H2, L, P
L and Z
D
L are given. The VAT-exempted firm is able to extract by 
P
EEGA in market 1 and P
LLMA in market 2. The value added tax revenues which are caused 





Figure 6:  Price Discrimination and VAT-exemption 
 











D) (see figure 7 and also appendix 6). Using its monopoly 







D). In order to maximize monopoly profits both marginal revenue curves must be 
horizontally aggregated to MR
D and then be equated with the sum of constant marginal costs 
for upstream and increasing marginal costs for downstream. Point H which leads to shadow 
price Q indicates profit maximizing condition. Assuming that price discrimination is possible 
the intersection points of the marginal revenue curves with both marginal costs lead to the 













2. The new monopoly profits are PND1FNI and PND2LMI. Tax 
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Figure 7: Price discrimination and No-VAT-exemption 
 
By abolishing the VAT-exemption three different welfare effects are relevant. First, the 
profits in market 1 increase, whereas they decrease in market 2. Tax revenues will increase in 
both markets. Consumer surplus which are relevant for market 1 would be lower, in market 2 
increasing surplus can be expected. Out weighting all three effects in both markets lead to 
positive welfare consequences by UVEPGD1 (+11.37 per rata ZD
E) by U`V´KPGD2 (+0,36 per 
rata ZD
L) in figure 7 (see also appendix 6). 
 
 
4.4 The dominant-firm model 
 
The dominant-firm-model is based on two central assumptions (see Carlton/Perloff 2000, 
107-118). On the one hand, the dominant firm is able to select prices like a monopolist. On 
the other hand, the dominant firm is faced with small firms which are price-takers (fringe 
firms). Fringe firms can reach significant market shares all together. The dominant firm 
equalizes marginal revenue with marginal costs taking into account the quantity supplied by 
the fringe firms. The more market entries expected by the dominant firm, the lower the 
monopoly power of the dominant firm. The market power of dominant firm may be caused by 
lower costs or differentiated products. Better management, patents, learning curve advantages, 
realized economies of scale in the past, or benefits created by the state (tax or toll advantages, 
previous market entry restrictions) can be important for lower costs of the dominant firm. 
Product differentiation means that the dominant firm produces goods at higher quality, 
whereas fringe firms serve market niches. 
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show the market conditions which are given for fringe firms. One typical fringe firm f 
operates according to marginal cost curve MC
D
f and to average cost curve AC
D
f. We assume 
that only three identical firms are active in the market. Aggregating horizontally the marginal 
cost curves leads to supply curve S
D
f of fringe firms. D
D represents the market demand curve. 
The shape of long run average cost curve (LAC
D
d) and marginal cost curve (MRC
D
d) indicates 
unlimited economies of scale at downstream stage. These cost conditions are relevant for 
dominant firm. D
D represents the market demand curve. If the market price is higher than or 
equal to P
1, the whole downstream market will be served by the fringe firms. In case of a 
price lower than P
2 no fringe firm is willing to serve the downstream market. If prices 
between P
1 and P
2 are charged, fringe firms supply according to S
D
f. Thus, the demand curve 
which is relevant for the dominant firm is given by D
D
d (dashed line). DD(1-t
D) is equal to the 
derived demand curve if downstream market will be taxed with t
D. Calculating marginal 




D) can be drawn (also dashed line). Equalizing marginal revenue with 
long run marginal curve leads to point H. Thus, the gross price P
D
G, the net price P
D
N and the 
optimal quantity Z
D* can be derived. The profit of the dominant downstream firm is equal to 
P
D




N. Because we have 





N. Taxes revenues are created on downstream market, by t
D·Z
D*, and, if we are 




Figure 8: Dominant firm and VAT 
 
Figure 9 represents the situation with VAT-exemption. Fringe firms are value added taxed as 
before, hence no change for marginal costs, average costs and their supply curve are given.   15
The dominant firm should be VAT-exempted. Therefore, on the one hand the derived demand 
curve D
D
d and the marginal revenue curve MR
D
d are given. On the other hand, because of the 
VAT-exemption, the upstream VAT t
U cannot be deducted. Consequently, higher marginal 
and average costs are inevitable. Equalizing marginal revenues with marginal costs leads to 
point H, profits of dominant firm by P
TTCA, profit of fringe firms 3·(P
TLMF), and tax 
revenues corresponding to upstream market t
U·Z
D* (ignoring lower additional VAT paid by 
fringe firms because of lower quantities in downstream markets.) 
 
Figure 9: Dominant firm and VAT-exemption 
 
If we compare both regimes abolishing of VAT-exemption creates lower profits for dominant 
firm and fringe firms, lower taxes revenues, but a little bit more consumer surplus because of 
lower price. In all, the society gains welfare. If we calculate this welfare effect referred to the 
market quantity in case of VAT, the welfare gain P






4.5 Market structure and VAT 
 
The consequences of abolishing VAT-exemption depends on the prevailing market structure 
(see table 1). Columns 2-4 show directions of influence in case of typical market structures. 
The values of column 5 are based on the assumption of special functions. Hence, the positive 
or negative welfare consequences are examples and cannot be generalized. In case of perfect 
competition lower (net) prices are decreasing the profits of suppliers, higher gross prices 
destroy consumer surplus, but more tax revenues will be generated. Accepting the used 
demand and supply conditions the enormous tax revenue increases are enough to compensate   16
the losses of profits and consumer surplus: the welfare effects are extremely positive. If we 
assume monopoly conditions, the private stakeholders worsen their positions, the state gains 
by additional tax revenues. Summing up by using specific functions, the welfare effects are 
negative, but very low. Price discrimination depends on the relevant market. The inelastic 
market 1 bears the same consequences as monopoly. In case of the elastic market 2 consumer 
and tax side will be improved, the welfare effect is positive. If we assume a dominant firm, 
this firm will be disadvantaged by lower profits, also fringe firms. Consumers will have 
benefits, and tax revenues will be higher. Assuming specific functions welfare effects are 
positive, but low. Summing up, abolishing VAT-exemptions of course leads to “profits” for 
the state because of higher tax revenues. Firm profits and consumer surplus can be influenced 
positive or negative depending of prevailing market condition. Without the case of monopoly 
we find positive welfare effects, but they could be very low.  
 












Perfect competition  Decrease decrease increase  ++ 
Monopoly Decrease  decrease  increase  (-) 
Price 
discrimination 
Market 1  Decrease  decrease  increase  + 
Market 2  Increase  Increase  increase  + 
Dominant firm 
Dominant Decrease 




5 The market structure of Postal Services in Germany 
 
In 2009 the whole postal market created revenues of 25.4 billion €, which must be splitted 
between the unregulated KEP submarket (messenger, parcel and express delivery; “Kurier-, 
Express- und Paketdienste”; 16 billion €) and the regulated letter market (9.4 € billions) (see 
Bundesnetzagentur 2010, p. 139).  
 
Looking on the KEP market in 2008, a total of 41 percent of the revenues were generated by 
delivery of parcels, 37% by express, and little bit more than one fifth by messenger services   17
(see Bundesnetzagentur 2010, p. 139). On the supply side we have several nationwide active 
suppliers, which are able to provide high quantities (DHL, DPD, FedEx, GLS, Hermes 
Logistics, TNT Express, and UPS) and small, specialized and regional restricted firms 
additionally, which are very often engaged in express and messenger services only (see 
Monopoly commission 2009, marginal note 38).  Table 2 shows the market shares of 
competitors and DPAG since the opening of the letter market in 1999. 
 
Table 2: Market shares in German market for letters  
Year 
Market shares (%) 
Competitors DPAG 
1999 1.3  98.7 
2000 1.7  98.3 
2001 2.4  97.6 
2002 3.0  97.0 
2003 3.9  96.1 
2004 5.3  94.7 
2005 7.6  92.4 
2006 10.7  89.3 
2007 11.3  88.7 
2008 10.7  89.3 
2009 11,8  88.2 
Sources: Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 27, and Bundesnetzagentur 2010, p. 142. 
 
If the letter market will be analyzed in detail, competitors have reached a market share of 11.6 
% for individual letters (2008, measured by revenues), but only 2.1 % for bulk mail (see 
Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 29-30). Concerning affidavits of service by mail 
(“Postzustellungsurkunden”), the regulation authority estimates competitors` market share of 
a quarter in 2008 (see Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 34). Until the end of 2008 the regulation 
authority chartered 2 500 market entry licenses, a little bit more than thousand had given up 
their licence (1047; see Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 35). Not more than 750 license owners 
could be seen as active in the market (see Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 142). The licenses can 
be applied for one region, one federal state or nationwide; nearly 30 percent applied for 
region, a little bit lower for federal state level and more than 43 percent nationwide (see 
Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 36). It can be assumed by certainty that a lot of firms do not use   18
their approved region. Ignoring the dominant firm DPAG, the letter market can be described 
by a great number of small firms. In 2008 about 200 firms received revenues until 10 000 €, 
127 until 100.000 €, 121 until 500 000 €, 49 until 1 million €, 109 until 10 million €, 15 until 
50 million €, and 4 more than 50 million €. In Germany, the regulation authority, Federal 
Network Agency (BNetzA), publishes revenues and the amount of postal items on annual 
base. Dividing revenues by postal items leads to average prices (see Table 3). During nearly 
all years since deregulation the DPAG was charging lower average prices than their 
competitors. Only in 2003 the inverse relationship is given. But Table 3 does not differentiate 
between postal services submarkets.  
 
Table 3: Average Prices in € 
 DPAG  Competitors 
1999 0.65  0.70 
2000 0.62  0.69 
2001 0.62  0.64 
2002 0.61  0.65 
2003 0.59  0.63 
2004 0.59  0.58 
2005 0.58  0.66 
2006 0.57  0.69 
2007 0.56  0.69 
2008 0.54  0.71 
 
Using table 4 submarkets could be identified for 2008. Columns three and four show the 
tariffs of the competitors, left median prices and right unweighted average prices. Column 
two presents the official tariffs which are charged by DPAG. But if business customers are 
able to sort delivered items or convey huge scales they receive rebates. Hence, business 
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Table 4: Prices for Postal Services in € (2008) 
      DPAG Competitors 
 Letters     Official price  Median price 
Unweighted 
average price 
up to 20 g  0.55  0.42  0.41 
up to 50 g  0.90  0.66  0.60 
up to 100g  1.45  0.97  0.96 
up to 500g  1.45  0.99  0.97 
up to 1000g  2.20  1.54  1.50 
more than 1000g  3.90  2.50  2.68 
 
Comparing 2008 and 2007, the regulation authority found out that the competitors increase 
the percentage of using the infrastructure of DPAG (sorting centres, delivery network). 
Hence, it seems plausible that German market converge to the British in which there is nearly 
no competition on the delivery stage, but more by using infrastructure of Royal Mail. After 
the German Parliament had passed the new VAT-Law the incumbent DPAG announced its 
price reaction (see FAZ 2010). Generally, it would like to adjust her rebates to stay 
competitive. Granting twelve percent rebates for letters, information items and heavy parcels 
to major customers (conveying big quantities or prepared items) leads to stable gross prices. 
VAT-rated major customers receive lower net prices, because it is legally forbidden to 
discriminate between business customers. Addressed information items and 
newspapers/journals will not receive additional rebates, because non VAT-rated customers 
usually send these products. Moreover, the new rebates are in favour of competitors, if they 
are using the postal network of DPAG by consolidation. Major customers who have passed 
individual contracts do not receive rebates automatically. Dependent on her competitive 
position, DPAG is able to adjust gross tariffs as consequence of the elimination of VAT-
exemption.  
 
The different market activities have important consequences for the profitability of the firms. 
The DPAG reaches for letters a profit-turnover margin of 15.7 % (12.9 %) in 2008 (2007), but 
for the whole trust -1.0 % (5.0) (see Monopolycommisson 2009, marginal note 49). The 
regulation authority investigated 426 active licence owners with more than 10 000 € in 2007   20
and found that 41 % were working profitable, but nearly the same number made losses (39 
%). 
 
The institutional setting and the empirical facts indicate that the German postal service market 
could be described by the model of dominant firm. Private customers and small business 
customers which convey little postal items (low costs shares or low possibilities to prepare 
post items) effectively have no alternative to DPAG. If business customers are able to prepare 
postal items for local markets, they could choose between DPAG and private competitors, 
sometimes one supplier in a local area, other times several competitive firms. Other business 
customers convey nationwide postal services, the distribution channel “postal networks” are 
decisive for their market strategies. Examples are mail order companies or publishing houses. 
They are able to prepare postal items by sorting for regions and to deliver items to sorting 
centres. Such business customers are able to negotiate contracts individually or to claim 
customer specific rebates. Hence, we partially have strong competition, but the DPAG very 
often possesses a monopoly position. In contrary to the model of dominant firm, we are not 
able to identify uniform prices, which could indicate that different submarkets exist. 
Assuming that market for postal services in Germany can be adequately described by the 
theory of dominant firm, we are able to forecast positive welfare consequences in case of 
abolishing VAT-consequences. Positive welfare consequences mean that we are able to 
compensate DPAG for fulfilling USO and have further advantages by increasing consumer 





Universal service obligations are very often dictated for infrastructure services. VAT-
exemptions are one instrument to finance such obligations. Such kind of “pay or play 
regulation” can be an alternative to fulfil USO without preventing competition. Following the 
German regulation tradition the DPAG was VAT-exempted until June 2010. After this date 
competitors could also be exempted, if they are able to fulfil USO. The microeconomic 
analysis shows that the abolishing of VAT exemption raises tax revenues independent of the 
assumed marked structures. The profits and consumer surplus very often go down, but in 
some cases are increasing. Assuming special demand and cost functions welfare can normally 
be improved by complete value added taxation without reducing the “payments” for USO.   21
Only in the case of monopoly welfare would be lower by value added taxation. The empirical 
evidence indicates that the DPAD can behave as a dominant firm and/or is able to price 
discriminate. Thus, a full abolishing of all postal services VAT-exemptions has positive 
welfare consequences without jeopardizing the financial background for USO in this market. 
Moreover, the new tax law goes into the wrong direction. Generally spoken, franchise bidding 
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Increasing tax revenues in case of abolishing VAT-exemption: 
290.54-133.24=157.3. 




Profits in case of exemption: 
CGM=0.5(110.805-92.415)18.39=169.10. 
Decreasing profits in case of non-exemption: 
123.92-169.10=-36.18. 






(17.065+4.2135)=-21.28.   24









































































































Welfare consequences from “with exemption” to “without exemption”: 






























































D=   26



















































































Consumer Surplus:  
WHK=0.5(100-88.9)22.2=123.21. 
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    Market 1  Market 2 
Profits with  exemption  949.76  839.16 
without exemption  898.511  1254.40 
∆ 51.25  -415.24 
Tax revenues  with exemption  150  222 
without exemption  299.922  650.763 
∆ +149.92  +428.76 
Consumer surplus  with exemption  240.25  123.21 
without exemption  215.38  190.12 
∆ -24.87  +66.91 
Aggregate effects    176.3  80.43 
 by  quantity  without  176.3/15.5=+11.37  80.43/22.2=+0.36 




Appendix 7: Calculations concerning figure 8 
 
























































































D, if P≥60, else 108-0.9Z
D. 























































Profits fringe firms: 





















In case of 3 firms =17.2·3=51.6.   31
 









Appendix 8: Calculations concerning figure 9 
 
Without taxation 











































In case of 3 fringe firms: 
3(21.125)=63.4. 
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Change from “with exemption” to “without exemption” 
Profits 
with exemption  1720.9 
without exemption  1584.6 
∆ -136.3 
Tax revenues 
with exemption  628.56 
without exemption  1272.27 
∆ +643.71 
Consumer surplus 
with exemption  1640,25 






by quantity   350.54/84.79=4.13 
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